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Abstract—While  our  paper-based  records  and  documents  are 
gradually digitized, security concerns about how such electronic 
data is stored and transmitted have increased. This has a serious 
impact  on  our  healthcare  information  system,  as  it  contains 
sensitive  patient  data.  The  prevention  of  unauthorized 
modification  and  loss  of  records  is  highly  important  in  the 
healthcare  sector.  What’s  more,  information  owners  have 
increasing  demands  regarding  their  rights  of  ownership. 
Therefore,  a  secured  user-centric  healthcare  information 
management  system  is  not  only  required  but  also  important.  
This  paper  presents  a  protocol  for  the  management  of 
healthcare  information  in  the  form  of  a  securely  distributed 
eHealthcare  document,  the  eHealth-eCert.    By  analysis of  the 
eHealthcare problem domain, a system has been derived with 
both  eCert  supported  functions  and  eHealthcare  unique 
features. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally in the world of IT security, we tend to take 
what one might call a “Fortress Approach”.  We are systems 
orientated, and view our role as being one of protecting the 
system  against  misuse  by  both  outside  attackers  and 
uninformed  legitimate  users.    However,  the  world  within 
which we operate is changing – we now need to deal with 
peer-to-peer networking, social networking and linked data.  
In this environment, there is increasing user concern about the 
security of their data. 
Such  concern  is  compounded  by  the  knowledge  that 
institutions that we ought to be able to depend upon are in fact 
unreliable.  In the UK, the government has been responsible 
for the loss of 10 million personal records that included bank 
account  details[1],  and  other  examples  exist  of  serious 
breaches of security protocol. 
In  this  context,  it  is  understandable  that  plans  to 
computerize  patient  records  in  the  US  have  caused  public 
anxiety.    Besides  the  potential  for  human  error  as  noted 
above,  there  is  also  legitimate  concern  that  confidential 
patient  data  could  be  passed  on  to  other  organisations  for 
financial gain.  Without a system of checks in place, there is 
no  guarantee  that  the  confidential  patient  data  won’t  be 
abused. 
As a result of a wave of security breaches, there are now 
pressing  calls  for  an  opt-in  system  to  be  implemented  for 
healthcare systems, giving patients the opportunity to choose 
whether or not to have their healthcare information collected 
and recorded.  The security of healthcare information in the 
context of a networked, sensor-enabled, pervasive and mobile 
computing  infrastructure  is  at  the  core  of  both  the  main 
challenges and potential risks of Healthcare ICT adoption. 
Similar problem scenarios have been encountered in the 
realm of ePortfolios, where students maintain a record of their 
work and achievements.  The intention is to make this record 
accessible to potential recruiters and employers, but they also 
may  wish  to  protect  against  unauthorised  collection  of 
personal data by disreputable parties. 
In  order  to  address  the  ePortfolio  problem,  the  eCert 
project has developed a user-centric eDocument transmission 
protocol,  the  eCert  protocol,  which  enables  users  to  share 
their data whilst still maintaining a measure of control over 
when and how it may be viewed.  It has been demonstrated 
that this protocol has wider application than just the ePortfolio 
scenario,  with  an  additional  project,  mobile  eID, 
demonstrating how this same approach can provide a way for 
personal  information,  such  as  on  a  passport,  to  be  made 
available  for  viewing  by  potentially  untrustworthy  parties, 
such as nightclub owners. 
In  this  paper,  we  will  explore  the  eCert  approach  as  a 
mechanism  for  providing  user-centric  control  over  eHealth 
data, derive a design to achieve our goals, and then assess the 
issues that arise as a result. 
II.  CURRENT HEALTHCARE INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
Traditionally,  healthcare  data  has  been  stored  in  filing 
cabinets.  “Data transmission” has consisted of paper records 
being put into envelopes and sending them by post, leading to 
incidents  of  records  being  lost.    In  progressing  to 
computerised  systems,  the  filing  cabinet  metaphor  has 
typically been applied to digital database design. 
There  are  various  levels  at  which  healthcare  data  is 
typically communicated, for example:    National level across communities 
  Regional level across organisations 
  Enterprise level with healthcare organisation 
  Global information reach 
The challenge for the healthcare scenario is how to make 
patient data available as required to those who need to know, 
whilst preventing data being transmitted to organisations who 
have no right to know. 
There are two competing aims we need to consider when 
designing  a  secure  system  for  sharing  of  healthcare  data.  
Firstly,  “Can  patient  authorised  data  to  be  made  available 
without  reservation  or  delay  in  an  emergency  scenario?”  
Therefore,  the  patient  does  not  want  the  doctor(s)  to  be 
hindered  in  treating  them  because  their  date  cannot  be 
accessed.  However, to ensure that sensitive personal details 
are not visible to those that have no right to see them.  These 
two aims are conflict paradox.  The safest way to ensure best 
practice in an accident and emergency (A&E) is to be able to 
view patient data as when it is required. The question remains 
“Can  my  data  be  visible  to  those  who  are  not  obliged  or 
authorised to do so. 
A full healthcare information system includes the full data 
relating  to  a  patient’s  care  and  includes  information  on 
support  systems,  for  examples.    In  this  paper,  we  wish  to 
restrict our focus specifically to patient data.  So we will focus 
on the security issues of patients’ data management, known in 
this paper as the Patient Record System (PRS). 
III.  HEALTHCARE SCENARIO  
A number of healthcare scenarios have been selected and 
described below: 
A.  Sharing Healthcare Records:  
Increasingly  medical  records  are  being  stored 
electronically.  This creates potential problems for patients, 
doctors  and  clinicians  who  may  need  to  provide  partial  or 
time-limited access to third parties such as third party health 
providers  and  medical  insurance  companies.    As  with  any 
eDocument, validation is essential, but it is also paramount 
that  patient  confidentiality  is  not  violated,  and  that 
embarrassing  private  information  cannot  be  forwarded  to 
potentially malicious agents such as newspapers.       
Scenario 1: professor R in a psychology department needs 
to release the patients’ health history records to her fellow 
researchers.   However, by transferring the documents directly 
without going into them to delete some sensitive information  
individually, this leads to sensitive data being leaked,  and she 
still cannot ensure that the distributed documents will not be 
modified without authorisation, abused, or stolen.  
B.  Loss of Healthcare Records:  
Medical records are crucial to patients’ healthcare.  Data 
corruption (e.g. unauthorized modification of records due to 
hacked  databases  or  human  errors)  will  lead  to  wrong 
diagnosis,  while  loss  of  records  will  waste  inestimable 
amounts of valuable time. 
Scenario 2: Patient A has history of heart problems and 
has  been  taken  to  a  hospital  for  an  emergency  treatment.  
Normally, doctors can retrieve A’s health record to make an 
informed decision, but unfortunately, this time, A’s record is 
nowhere to be found, either in paper form or on a database.  
As a result, treatment has to be delayed, as doctors have to 
assess A as a new patient, and carry out new tests beforehand. 
IV.  UNDERLYING TECHNOLOGIES 
A.  eCert as policy for the signing and key management 
In  order  to  provide  a  solution  for  our  two  healthcare 
scenarios, we wish to employ the eCert protocol as mentioned 
earlier.    The  eCert  approach  defines  a  secured  and  signed 
document that enables the user to determine what a reviewer 
is allowed to see and for how long.  The file standard defines 
the content, format, and structure of what a eCert file is[2]. 
File  structure:  an  eCert  file  will  contain  three  sections: 
metadata, text content, and supported file outputs (can be in 
any format).  Both the text content and the support files can 
be subdivided into two types: compulsory and optional.  The 
text  output  will  formed  the  main  content,  no  matter 
compulsory or optional; the compulsory file outputs will be 
embedded within the main content, while the optional files 
will be attached. 
Signing method: optional files will be signed individually 
using  detached  signature.    Their  signature  values  and  the 
reference URI will then be embedded within the main content 
under the corresponding display conditions.  The document 
will then be signed using enveloped signature, and encrypted 
before distributed. 
Keys management: the system will use the issuer’s private 
key to sign the document, and use the system’s default public 
key,  or  the  receiver’s  public  key  to  encrypt  the  document, 
depend  on  the  applied  situations.    On  review,  the 
corresponding decrypt key, and the issuer’s public key will be 
used for verification. 
System structure: all supported systems will be installed 
locally in registered institutions, and link to the eCert central 
server.  In addition, an online central service will provide the 
public access for the required service.  In some cases, identity 
management system will be involved for access control. 
Usage control: user can choose who can see what and for 
how  long  by  setting  usage  control  on  section  display  and 
access time limits to a unique access token.   
A number of features of the eCert protocol may be noted. 
1)  Secure:  
The eCert approach is based on digital signing, but also 
addresses what is called the “eCertificate squared” problem.  
We  not  only  need  to  ensure  non-repudiation  and  the 
authenticity  of  the  document,  but  we  also  need  to  detect 
current validity to cover the potential revocation of the data as 
well as the classical case of the revocation of the signing key.  
This  means  it  is  more  secure  than  conventional  digital 
signing. 
2)  User-centric:  
By taking this approach, we address the ownership right.  
The owner can not only store, manage, share and track their personal  data,  but  can  also  tailor  their  documents  to  best 
support their needs.  In this way, the information is “under 
their control, with their consent, and for their benefit [3]”.   
3)  Lifetime Validation:  
The  eCert  signing  method  and  system  structure  design 
ensure  that  all  issued  eCert  files  are  independent  from  the 
issuing body.  They can therefore be validated for life even if 
the issuing body ceases to exist. 
4)  Verifiable distributed data: 
 The  eCert  signing  method  also  enable  the  distributed 
eDocument  to  be  verified  through  a  supported  service, 
without  the  need  of  storing  the  data.    This  provides  the 
advantage of saving huge storage and avoids database attacks 
dramatically. 
B.  The eCertificate and mobile eID as applied examples 
The eCert protocol has been successfully applied to two 
eDocument  transmitting  use  cases,  the  eCertificate  for 
ePortfolio, and the eID in mobile environments. 
1)  The eCertificate project 
 The  eCert  project[4]  is  a  UK  government-sponsored 
project to implement an electronic version of a Qualification 
Certificates System.  At the heart of this project is the initial 
eCert protocol which is being developed to address security 
issues which originally arose as a concern within the field of 
ePortfolios.  
With the employed eCert protocol, it has proposed a user-
centric  eCertificate  system,  which  enables  the  eCertificate 
owners  to  have  usage  control  over  their  documents  before 
distributing  to  the  reviewers,  prevent  unauthorized 
modification and distribution.   
The  Delphi  methodology[5]  was  employed  for  the 
evaluation  of  eCertificate  system  design  through  out  its 
development  stages  alongside  the  SORM  research 
methodology[6].    By  following  this  method,  a  group  of 
domain experts in the UK have been selected for the purpose 
of security system design, ePortfolio study, and represent of 
the  stakeholders,  this  includes  employment  managers,  IT 
security  experts,  exam  board  managers,  and  ePortfolio 
researchers.  Two workshops have been run during two stages 
of the development to collect the professional opinions from 
these experts: one at the end of the system design stage, aim 
to evaluate and adjust the system from the strategic level; and 
the  other  one  on  demo  completion  stage,  the  system  is 
brought  back  to  the  domain  experts  after  the  design 
adjustments and demonstrator production, aim to evaluate the 
system from the technical level.  
The system has been further evaluated under a subproject 
named Integrating eCert in ePortfolios[7] to test the usage of 
the design principle.  Through this project, the eCertificate 
system has been integrated and operative the UK ePortfolio 
system,  the  eFolio[8],  and  an  Australian  system,  the 
Mahara[9].  Both  systems  can  now  be  fully  utilized.    As  a 
result, it has proved the usage of the system successfully as it 
can not only be used standalone but can also be plugged into 
other  applications.      The  eCert  protocol  has  also  been 
improved through the process. 
2)  The Mobile eID project 
As  the  case  of  eCertificate  study  represents  the  typical 
eDocument transmitting issues, it is believed that the concept 
of its solution could in turn solve the eDocument transmitting 
issues in other cases.  Therefore, with the aim of proving this 
hypothesis, evaluate the applicability of the eCert protocol 
in  a  wider  domain, the concept of the eCertificate solution is 
being  tested  under  a  project,  Mobile  eID,  to  explore  the 
issues  that  arise  in  implementing  the  eCert  protocol 
within a mobile platform to provide certified, certifiable, 
and protected identity information. 
The eID system has been compared and analysis with the 
eCertificate system in terms of file structure, system structure, 
transferring  paths,  verifying  processes,  and  their  applied 
environments.  it has been noted that even the idea of the eID 
and  eCertificate  is  quite  close,  they  are  different  in  many 
ways.  The eCert protocol that initially designed for managing 
eCertificates in a web environment is not able to manage eID 
in a mobile environment straight away - a reverse engineering 
process to adapt the system is needed.[10] 
As a result, the eCert protocol has been reviewed, and the 
successful eID project, which implemented a working demo 
system  on  Android  platform,  has  proved  that  the  eCert 
protocol  can  be  applied  in  a  wide  eDocument  transmitting 
domain. 
V.  BENEFIS AND DRAWBACKS ON APPLYING  ECERT TO 
EHEALTHCARE 
The eCert protocol provides a unique, secure and trusted 
system for the management of data with a secure user-centric 
approach. This user-centric focus is key to the case of patient 
records management.  Unlike the case of mobile eID, which 
has drawbacks of requiring reverse engineering process due to 
the  immature  of  the  eCert  protocol,  there  is  currently  no 
known drawback for the eCert protocol to be employed in the 
case of eHealthcare - the updated version of eCert protocol 
has been designed to include the abstracted comment features 
in eDocument transmitting domain.   
However, the eCert protocol is newly developed, even it 
has been successfully evaluated through two projects, it may 
still contain some unaddressed hidden issues.  
VI.  THE PROPOSED EHEALTHCARE PROTOCOL 
In applying the eCert protocol to the eHealthcare problem, 
our  aim  is  to  provide  a  mechanism  for  user-centric 
distribution of data.  In this way,  we seek to  give patients 
control of their data in terms of who is allowed to see it.  In 
order to achieve this aim, we require security controls for the 
issue and distribution of data, and a verification service for 
this distributed data. 
A.  Use case 
In developing the use cases for this problem, we note that 
there  are  three  stakeholders:  the  issuer,  the  owner  (i.e. 
patient), and the reviewer.  We may consider a couple of PRS 
use case scenarios which have been developed to highlight the 
benefits  and  issues  related  to  the  data  transferring  in  the 
healthcare sector. For example, one of the use cases, Record healthcare history, is shown in Table1.  These use cases are 
framed in terms of using a PRS. 
Table1. Use case - Record healthcare history 
eHealthcare use case – Record healthcare history 
Description  A healthcare sector staff wishes to record a 
patient’s healthcare information after 
providing the treatment 
Actors    Patient 
  Healthcare sector staff 
Scenario  1.  Patient requires treatment and provide 
related information 
2.  Healthcare sector staff retrieves the 
patient’s healthcare history from PRS, 
and assess the patient 
3.  patient receives treatment  
4.  healthcare sector staff record the 
treatment process and result in PRS 
Variations  If the patient has no record in the PRS yet, 
the healthcare sector staff can start from 
creating a new account  
Benefits    Patient: all treatment history is in 
record, no need to memorise them, 
specially the details in medical terms.   
  Healthcare sector: maintain patients’ 
healthcare history can provide efficient 
assessment, enable informed decision, 
and therefore, better treatment result 
Issues  Records in PRS have risks: e.g. 
unauthorized modification, human errors, 
and database attacks.   
  Incorrect record will lead to wrong 
treatments  
  Lost of record or a whole database will 
affect the efficient of assessments 
It is not easy for a patient to find out what is 
being held about them in the system, or to 
retrieve the information for any personal 
purposes (e.g. forward it to a private 
healthcare provider) 
 
B.  eHealthcare compared with eCertificate & eID 
By comparing the use cases of the three different systems, 
we may see that the implementation of the eCert protocol for 
eHealthcare  is  a  mix  version  of  the  eCertificate  and  eID 
applications, but with some unique features: 
1)  File structure: 
 Unlike eCertificate and eID which are issued for personal 
use, an eHealthcare document may contain group information 
for research purposes, as well as for individual use.   It should 
to be constructed with optional text sections as in eID (e.g. to 
bind  in  some  relevant  data  when  required),  and  secured 
support files as in eCertificate (e.g. an image of a scan or x-
ray).  This is shown diagrammatically in Figure 1.  
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2)  Usage control:  
In  both  the  eCertificate  and  eID  applications,  further 
transfer  of  the  eDocument  from  the  reviewer  is  prevented.  
However, in the case of eHealthcare, this should be allowed 
as the reviewer will normally also be a staff of a certified 
healthcare  sector, and they  all  have the  needs  and  right  to 
further  transfer  the  document  to  its  desired  department.  
Therefore,  not only the owner, but all stakeholders, should 
have the usage control of the document.  But, to protect the 
information privacy, we need to ensure that only the specified 
reviewer can access it, and no one should be able to access 
more information than what they have on receipt (no hidden 
information  should  be  made  available  on  further 
transmission).  This is shown diagrammatically in Figure 2. 
3)  Technical skills: 
Unlike the case of eCertificate and eID, the information 
owners in the eHealthcare case are patients, which can be any 
age, may be new to computing technologies, or may have no 
capability of managing their own documents.   We need to 
find a way so that they can have the required data in a simple 
but secured method. issuer(education institution)
further reviewer (any, e.g. job agency)
reviewer (further education or employer)
owner(student)
-send 1
-receive 0..*
-send 1..*
-receive 1
-send 1
-receive 0..*
prevented
eCertificat and eID distribution path
issuer(healthcare sector)
reviewer (healthcare sector) owner (patient)
further reviewer (healthcare sector)
-send 1..*
-receive 1..*
-send 1..*
-receive 1
-send 1
-receive 0..*
-send
1
-receive
0..*
allowed
eHealthcare distribution path
 Figure 2. document transmission paths 
 
C.  The design: 
The  eHealthcare  application  will  be  formed  from  two 
subsystems: issuing, and reviewing.  These two subsystems 
will be installed locally in registered healthcare providers, and 
link  to  the  central  eCert  server.  While  these  installed 
subsystems will only be accessed by authorized staff, there 
will  also  be  an  online  publicly-accessed  central  reviewing 
subsystem  for  patients  to  view,  set  controls,  and  distribute 
their own documents.  
The  issuing  subsystem  will  collect  the  required 
information  from  the  PRS  according  to  the  specified  input 
criteria, and will then sign and encrypt the document using the 
eCert protocol. 
The reviewing subsystem will take the uploaded eHealth-
eCert file as input, decrypt and verify the document against 
content  modification,  status  validation,  signing  key 
revocation, access time limit, and display the enabled visible 
section(s).  The user is allowed to set further access control to 
the document after a successful verification process.   
By applying the eCert protocol to eHealthcare, a digitally-
signed  eHealthcare  document,  an  eHealth-eCert,  can  be 
created according to the specified criteria.  Such an eHealth-
eCert will follow the eCert user-centric approach, and will be 
secured  to  ensure  confidentiality,  integrity  and  availability 
during  its  issue,  distribution,  management,  and  verification 
processes.  This is shown as use cases in figure 3. 
Confidentiality  is  also  called  secrecy  or  privacy.    It 
ensures  that  computer-related  assets  are  accessed  only  by 
authorized parties.  To address the information confidentiality 
issue in the case of the sharing of healthcare records, senders 
need  to  be  able  to  select  the  required  data  that  will  be 
available  to  which  receiver  and  for  how  long.  As  all 
stakeholders  can be both  sender and receiver,  they  will  all 
have the right the set access control values.    
eHealtheCert issuer
eHealtheCert reviewer eHealtheCert owner / patient
issue
view/manage
distribute
eCert system
receive
create
record
secure
verify
includes
further transfer
view/manage
includes
verify
receive
Figure 3. eHealthcare system use cases 
 
To ensure that no one can access more information than 
that  which  they  have  on  receipt,  any  optional  non-display 
sections will not be able to make visible, and non-display files 
will not be included for further transfer.  However, the title(s) 
of the blinded section(s) will be indicated, and the originally 
document  issuer  can  be  traced.    Therefore,  the  blinded 
information can be required if needed.  
Staff will all have their own unique key pairs within the 
system.  When transferring eHealth-eCert documents between 
healthcare sectors, unique encryption keys will be employed 
for each document to ensure that only the specified reviewer 
can access it. 
When  issuing  the  initial  eHealth-eCert document  to  the 
patient, the system default encryption key will be employed to 
enable all stakeholders can access it.  This appears to mitigate 
against the privacy, but provides availability in an emergency 
situation  when  the  information  must  be  provided  by  an 
incapable  patient.    Patients  can  set  a  unique  key  to  their 
documents through the reviewing subsystem when preferred.  
To  backup  the  security  issue,  a  log  of  access  IPs  will  be 
maintained.  What is more, a list of encrypting options could 
be  provided  for  advance  users  with  specified  privacy 
requirements. This use of keys is indicated in Table 2. 
Integrity in computing security implies that assets can be 
modified  only  when  they  are  under  authorized  control, 
specifying  who or what can access which resources and in 
what ways.  By applying the eCert technique, we employ the 
eCert  signature  method  with  the  corresponding  system 
structure  design  so  that  the  document  access  key  will  be 
verified, together with its signing key status, content status, 
expiry time, and access time.  These are all validated, with 
any unauthorized modifications being detected. 
For an individual healthcare history, an eHealth-eCert can 
be created and made available to the patient. This can act as a 
backup  to  the  PRS,  in  that  it  will  not  only  address  the 
availability issues in the case of loss records, but will also 
benefit some patients.  This is especially so for those who know they may require emergency treatments.  They can even 
carry it with them, such as a bracelet style USB, to provide 
their certified identity and healthcare history.  What is more, 
issuing  an  eHealth-eCert  to  a  patient  also  gives them  back 
control of their data.  It addresses the information ownership 
right, since patients are now free to choose where, who, or 
how to present their personal data.  They can even afford to 
choose “not to have their healthcare information collected and 
recorded  in  the  healthcare  information  system”[11],  as  the 
eCert  technique  enables  the  document  to  be  owner-
controllable,  verifiable,  securely  transferred,  with  lifetime 
validation, and easy backup. 
Table2. eHealthcare system keys 
Signing and verifying process 
Signing key  Issuer private key 
Verifying key  Issuer public key 
Encrypt and decrypt on issuing process 
Issuing path 
options 
Encrypt key  Decrypt key 
Within  healthcare 
sector 
Receiver 
public key 
Receiver 
private key 
Healthcare sector 
to patient with 
open access 
System 
default public 
key 
System default 
private key 
Healthcare sector 
to patient with 
controlled access 
Patient public 
key 
Patient private 
key 
Encrypt and decrypt on access control process for 
further transfer 
Transfer path 
options 
Encrypt key  Decrypt key 
Within  healthcare 
sector 
Receiver 
public key 
Receiver 
private key 
Healthcare sector 
to patient  
System 
default 
public key 
System default 
private key 
Patient to any 
reviewers (Open 
access) 
System 
default 
public key  
System default 
private key 
Patient to already 
known receiver 
Receiver 
public key 
Receiver 
private key 
Patient to 
unknown specified 
receiver 
Newly 
generated 
unique 
private key 
The unique 
corresponding 
public key 
 
VII.  ISSUES 
The balance for the data confidential and availability in 
security  control  in  healthcare  is extreme: on one  hand, the 
patients’ data is considered as highly sensitive, required high 
level of security; on the other hand, the information need to be 
available in emergency events without any trapdoors.  
The  eHealthcare  system  was  designed  to  maintain  high 
level  security  when  the  document  is  transferred  between 
healthcare  sectors  (signed,  encrypted,  and  required  unique 
access key), and low level security when issuing to the patient 
(with open access by default), but provide the functions for 
the patients to upgrade the security level if concerned.   This 
is aim for the availability, especially if the document is the 
only  available  verifiable  information  that  provided  by  an 
incapable patient in an emergency situation.  
Whether this approach is suitable or not, could become the 
main security argument.  
VIII.  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In  this  paper  we  have  identified  the  issues  around 
eCertification  in  eHealth  documents.  This  has  led  to  the 
eHealth protocol and design of a system to address the issues 
identified.  
By  employing  the  eCert  protocol,  the  eHealth-eCert 
document can be used standalone or in parallel with the PRS, 
as  a  secured  and  independently  verifiable  backup  to  the 
existing  system.    It  could  be  the  answer  to  the  current 
healthcare  information  system  security  problems.    It  also 
provides advantages over the exiting system, as it satisfies the 
information ownership right, and enables the owner to have 
control of their data.   
The  design  is  independent  of  any  particular 
implementation.  In  the  next  stage  of  the  project  we  will 
investigate various methods and approaches to implement the 
design and evaluate such an approach.  
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